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The global economy faces a number of economic challenges: 
Economic growth in most industrialized nations is slowing, the crisis-
hit countries of Southern Europe are suffering the effects of low 
competiveness and, even in some G7 countries, sovereign debt has 
reached levels in excess of 100 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (see figure 1). As domestic demand is weak, many industrialized 
nations are banking on increasing their exports in order to boost 
domestic production and employment. However, this is resulting in 
large current account imbalances worldwide.  
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Current account imbalances are a challenge for the 
global economy… 
These imbalances lead to considerable problems, particularly if they are persistent: 
Deficit countries see a rise in unemployment and foreign debt. Current account bal-
ances are not without risk for surplus countries either: The labor market’s heavy re-
liance on exports leads to a rapid decline in employment if world trade collapses as 
a result of a global economic crisis. Gold and foreign currency inflows may lead to 
inflationary trends. Overseas assets may fall in value if the claims on the foreign 
company or country become worthless (the company or even the country in question 
becomes bankrupt) or if the foreign currency is sharply devalued (see Petersen 
2010). 
Due to the repercussions mentioned, current account imbalances can also have con-
sequences for the entire global economy and therefore affect economies running a 
balanced current account. In this context, the risk of growing protectionism is partic-
ularly worthy of mention. Added to this is the threat of a global devaluation race, as 
some economies – particularly countries running current account deficits – could try 
to solve their current account problems by devaluing the domestic currency. If coun-
tries with export surpluses were also to respond by devaluing their currency in order 
to avert the threat of a slump in production and employment, this would lead to a 
global increase in money supply, as the increase in the supply of a country’s own 
currency leads to the desired devaluation of the domestic currency. The global sur-
plus of liquidity would therefore continue to grow, increasing the risk of speculative 
bubbles.  
 
…and for economic policy 
For highly advanced industrialized nations, the economic environment outlined re-
sults in a number of economic policy challenges. Three aspects are of particular im-
portance for global economic trends: 
1. In advanced industrialized nations, production and employment can no longer be 
boosted by increasing government debt further, as debt has already reached lev-
els that are unsustainable in the long run. 
2. Expansive monetary policy is also reaching its limits, as central bank’s interest 
rates in most advanced industrialized nations are already close to zero. In addi-
tion, the continual increase in money supply is leading to a growing risk of infla-
tion and speculative bubbles. 
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3. The devaluation of the domestic currency may cause devaluation in the rest of the 
world, which may lead to a global devaluation race or currency war. Furthermore, 
countries that are a member of a currency union such as the euro are unable to 
devalue their currency. 
So, given these restrictions, how can advanced industrialized nations increase pro-
duction and employment? One tool that can be used to boost economic growth with-
out increasing government debt, without expanding the money supply and without 
devaluing the domestic currency is fiscal devaluation.  
 
The concept of fiscal devaluation 
Under fiscal devaluation, ancillary wage costs – usually social security contributions 
– are cut so as to make domestic products more competitive through a reduction in 
unit labor costs. Conversely, taxes are raised in order to prevent government debt 
from rising. In economic policy practice, this increase affects consumption taxes, i.e. 
primarily value-added or sales taxes (see European Commission 2013: 9, Farhi, Go-
pinath and Itskhoki 2014: 1 and Bernoth, Burauel and Engler 2014: 916). This com-
bination of a reduction in the social security contribution and an increase in VAT has 
consequences for the domestic labor market, export prospects and the domestic 
goods market. 
On the labor market, the decline in the price of labor, i.e. in the gross wage, leads to 
stronger corporate demand for labor. The volume of employment therefore increases. 
As ancillary wage costs are lower, the net wage goes up (see annex). This increases 
disposable income and therefore purchasing power as well. On the goods market, the 
higher level of employment usually results in higher production and therefore in an 
increase in the supply of goods. To prevent an excess supply of goods, demand for 
goods must rise. There are essentially three levers for this: 
1. Falling labor costs mean falling production costs and therefore a fall in the price 
of goods. As a result, domestically produced goods and services can be offered at 
lower prices abroad. As consumers abroad are charged their VAT rate, the in-
crease in domestic VAT is irrelevant to them (if the foreign country leaves its VAT 
unchanged and does not levy any additional taxes on products imported from the 
home country). The home country’s exports increase as a result. 
2. If a rise in employment coincides with a rise in the net wage, domestic purchasing 
power and therefore domestic demand for goods also increase. 
3. The cut in social security contributions means a reduction in production costs. 
Companies can therefore offer any given quantity of a good at a lower price. Taken 
by itself, the reduction in prices associated with this leads to an increase in de-
mand for goods. 
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At the same time, however, it is important to bear in mind that the increase in do-
mestic VAT also makes consumer goods more expensive and therefore reduces do-
mestic demand for goods. Overall, fiscal devaluation has two demand-boosting effects 
(an increase in incomes and a reduction in prices due to the cut in social security 
contributions) and one demand-reducing effect (an increase in prices due to the rise 
in the VAT rate) on the domestic goods market. From a theoretical perspective, it is 
uncertain which effects will predominate overall. If, however, employment growth is 
high and the price reductions resulting from the lower social security contributions 
are large, domestic demand for goods will increase. And even if the demand-reducing 
effect of the higher VAT rate predominates and domestic demand for goods therefore 
declines, this fall in demand may be offset by higher exports. 
On balance, the overall effect of fiscal devaluation on aggregate demand for goods 
can therefore be described as follows: If export demand and employment growth are 
sufficiently high, the increases in demand predominate, i.e. there is also demand for 
the additional production. Fiscal devaluation therefore leads to higher economic 
growth and lower unemployment. 
 
Fiscal devaluation in a global context 
The positive effects of fiscal devaluation outlined so far apply when just one country 
uses this economic policy tool. However, the success of fiscal devaluation depends 
on global conditions, i.e. in particular on how export partners respond. If, for example, 
a country’s main trading partners also apply this strategy, fiscal devaluation is less 
successful or even achieves nothing at all, as the improvement in international com-
petitiveness sought through fiscal devaluation is eliminated by the economic policy 
responses abroad. 
Therefore, an internationally coordinated approach is required if fiscal devaluation is 
to have the positive economic effects it is hoped it will achieve. Coordinated in the 
sense that only deficit countries apply this strategy and not countries with high ex-
port or current account surpluses. This would have a number of positive effects on 
the global economy: 
• Deficit countries could improve their international competitiveness and thus 
boost their exports with the result that their current account deficits fall and they 
are able to reduce unemployment. 
• This reduction in the current account deficit is achieved without manipulating the 
domestic currency, i.e. without any monetary policy measures that lead to the 
devaluation of the domestic currency. This reduces the risk of a global devaluation 
race. 
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• Internationally coordinated fiscal devaluation may help solve the competition cri-
sis in the euro zone, where the tool of nominal devaluation is no longer available 
to the crisis-hit countries of Southern Europe. 
• With this approach, surplus countries become less competitive, as a result of 
which their exports fall and imports rise. In the short term, this may lead to a 
decline in production and employment. However, surplus countries also benefit 
from the income growth in former deficit countries, where higher incomes push 
up demand for goods and therefore imports as well, with the result that the sur-
plus countries’ exports increase again. Thus, in the long run, fiscal devaluation 
may lead to more sustained global economic growth, without which surplus coun-
tries cannot continue to export either. 
 
Which countries should use fiscal devaluation? 
If fiscal devaluation is intended to promote growth and employment while at the 
same time helping to reduce global current account imbalances, there are several 
general conditions that need to be considered: 
• Fiscal devaluation is particularly suitable for countries with high wage taxation 
and low consumption taxation, as it is here that a reduction in social security 
contributions is likely to result in the highest employment growth. Furthermore, 
as consumption taxation is low, a rise in the VAT rate is likely to cause a moderate 
reduction in domestic consumer demand. 
• The main lever for the positive effects of fiscal devaluation on employment is the 
increase in exports, which is likely to happen if the home country has a high 
export ratio. This is mainly the case for small and open economies, meaning that 
fiscal devaluation has the effect of boosting employment primarily in small coun-
tries. Besides the export ratio, the structure of the export goods is also relevant. If 
the home country generates its export revenues primarily in the tourism sector, 
for example, and that sector is not exempt from the VAT increase, exports will 
not rise as hoped. 
• Labor intensity in production also plays an important role in how successful fiscal 
devaluation can be. If labor intensity is high, the reduction in the social security 
contribution leads to a relatively large decline in production costs. This results in 
both a relatively large increase in exports and a relatively large increase in em-
ployment – and therefore in domestic purchasing power and consumer demand 
as well. However, if production by domestic businesses is very capital intensive, 
a reduction in labor costs only leads to a small improvement in international com-
petitiveness. 
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• Fiscal devaluation can only reduce global current account imbalances if deficit 
countries use this tool and thus reduce their current account deficits. If, on the 
other hand, countries with export surpluses were to use fiscal devaluation, this 
would increase their exports and push up existing current account surpluses fur-
ther. 
Based on these considerations, it is possible to identify several countries for which 
fiscal devaluation as part of an internationally coordinated overall strategy is a useful 
tool and countries that should forgo this tool. The latter include Germany and Japan, 
as both countries have been running current account surpluses for years (see figure 
2). Fiscal devaluation is also likely to have limited effects on growth and employment 
in the U.S., as large economies such as the U.S. sell only a relatively small proportion 
of their domestic production abroad. 
For countries with current account deficits, fiscal devaluation is generally a way to 
achieve an improvement in international competitiveness and increase exports. It 
may be a useful measure in the case of “chronic trade deficits” in particular (see 
Bernoth, Burauel and Engler 2014: 922), as a current account deficit lasting many 
years is an indication of the country’s long-enduring competitive weakness. For this 
reason, fiscal devaluation would also be a useful tool for Italy: Although the country 
has been running small current account surpluses since 2013, these are attributable 
primarily to falling imports and less to rising exports. In 2010 and 2011, for example, 
the lack of international competitiveness was reflected in current account deficits of 
3.5 percent and 3.1 percent of GDP, respectively (see figure 2). 
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As already mentioned, fiscal devaluation is particularly suitable for countries with 
high wage taxation and low consumption taxation. The tax burden can be measured 
using the implicit tax rate, which is calculated by Eurostat for the EU countries. This 
concept measures the effective, or actual, burden on factors of production and eco-
nomic functions from taxes and government levies. 
Figure 3 shows the tax burden from government levies for selected countries. Look-
ing at the data for 2012, fiscal devaluation is a useful tool primarily for the crisis-hit 
countries of Southern Europe, and first and foremost for Italy: In 2012, the implicit 
tax rate on consumption was 17.7 percent (ranking only 22nd among all 28 EU coun-
tries with regard to the amount of the tax burden), while the implicit tax rate on labor 
was 42.8 percent (the highest burden of all the EU countries after Belgium). The pic-
ture is similar for Spain, where consumption taxation is 14 percent (28th and there-
fore last in the EU ranking) and the burden on labor 33.5 percent (16th).  
 
Economic policy implications for industrialized 
nations 
In light of the high level of government debt in most developed economies, fiscal 
devaluation is an attractive economic policy tool, as it is a budget-neutral measure 
and therefore prevents public debt from rising. It also achieves an improvement in 
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international competitiveness without any nominal wage reductions, which experi-
ence shows are difficult to implement. Finally, for countries with fixed exchange rates 
or a currency union, fiscal devaluation is a replacement for the nominal devaluation 
no longer at their disposal. There have been a number of fiscal devaluations in the 
euro zone in recent years, including in Ireland (2002), Germany (2007), Spain and 
Finland (2010), the Netherlands (2012) and France (2014) (see Bernoth, Burauel and 
Engler 2014: 918). 
However, for fiscal devaluation in one country to be able to boost production and 
employment, countries with current account surpluses must forgo this tool because 
if they also use fiscal devaluation, the relative competitiveness of countries around 
the world will not change at all. There is therefore a requirement for international 
solidarity and an internationally coordinated economic policy. The G7 and G20 are 
ideal institutions for coordinating economic policy. 
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Annex: Labor market effects of falling social security 
contributions 
Assuming normal labor supply and labor demand behavior on a labor market, a rise 
in the gross wage (wgr.) leads to a fall in corporate demand for labor and an increase 
in private household labor supply. If the government levies social security contribu-
tions, there is a net wage (wnet) that employees receive as well as the gross wage that 
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employers have to pay. If, to simplify the analysis, the social security contribution is 
assumed to be the only deduction from the gross wage and denoted here by , the 
relationship is as follows: wnet = wgr. –  . wgr. = (1 – ) . wgr.. In this case, corporate 
demand for labor still depends on the gross wage, but household labor supply is now 
determined by the amount of the net wage. In a wage/employment diagram (see fig-
ure 4), the existence of a social security contribution results in one labor demand 
curve dependent on the gross wage (Ld(wgr.)) and a second labor demand curve de-
pendent on the net wage (Ld(wnet)). The labor demand curve dependent on the net 
wage is constructed by moving the demand curve dependent on the gross wage to 
the wage/employment diagram’s origin. The point of intersection with the employ-
ment axis is the same for both labor demand curves. 
 
The labor market equilibrium before fiscal devaluation is given by the point of inter-
section of the labor supply curve dependent on the net wage (Ls(wnet)) and the labor 
demand curve dependent on the net wage (Ld(wnet)old). This equilibrium is marked by 
equilibrium employment (Lold) and the related net wage (wnetold) and gross wage 
(wgr.old). 
 
 
 
If, under fiscal devaluation, the social security contribution is cut (), the labor de-
mand curve dependent on the net wage once again moves away from the origin 
slightly. The new labor market equilibrium is marked by higher employment (Lnew  
Lold), a higher net wage and a lower gross wage. This means a higher net income for 
employees and lower labor costs, and therefore lower production costs, for busi-
nesses.  
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